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ABSTRACT
Over the past several years, two former bandmates in the 1960s rock
group, The Turtles, have initiated several lawsuits against the popular
music streaming services, Pandora and Sirius XM, arguing that the
band owns common law copyrights in the sound recordings of its
songs, and that these state-level copyrights grant the band an exclusive
public performance right in its sound recordings. If accepted, this ar-
gument has the potential to significantly distort federal copyright pol-
icy because states would not be constrained by any of the balancing
features of the Copyright Act, including Digital Millennium Copyright
Act (DMCA) safe harbors for Internet Service Providers (ISPs), statu-
tory licenses under 17 USC § 114, or even the limitations, such as fair
use, in §§ 107 through 122.
In spite of how detrimental state-by-state copyright policymaking could
be to Congress’s policy choices embodied in the Copyright Act, federal
courts have not applied any form of preemption that would prevent
states from legislating at will in this area, because § 301(c) appears to
contain a disavowal of preemption for any state law dealing with pre-
1972 sound recordings. This note advances an interpretation of
§ 114(a) that would expressly preempt state-level public performance
rights in pre-1972 sound recordings as well as an interpretation of
§301(c) that would greatly narrow the scope of the disavowal of pre-
emption, allowing federal courts to strike down state laws that severely
distort federal copyright policy.
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INTRODUCTION
Since 2013, Flo & Eddie, Inc., a company founded by former bandmates
in The Turtles, has initiated several copyright lawsuits against Pandora and
Sirius XM for violating the band’s public performance rights in their songs,
including their Billboard number one 1967 single, “Happy Together”.1 Fed-
eral copyright law does not protect sound recordings created prior to Febru-
ary 15, 1972.2 Furthermore, even for post-1972 sound recordings, federal
law does not provide for a general public performance right3 (the exclusive
right of the copyright owner to perform a non-static work, for example, by
singing a song or staging a play, in “any place where a substantial number of
persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its social acquaintances is
gathered”4). So Flo & Eddie have, instead, relied on state law, arguing that
state copyright statutes and common law copyright principles establish a
public performance right in pre-1972 sound recordings.5 The New York
Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of Florida have rejected this argu-
ment under New York and Florida common law, respectively,6,7 and the 9th
Circuit has recently certified the question to the Supreme Court of
California.8,9
1. John M. Gatti et al., Flo, Eddie and Pre-1972 Sound Recordings: Happy Together,
LEXOLOGY (June 1, 2017), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=85522619-4ef7-
41df-bec0-791e8940b9cc.
2. 17 U.S.C. § 301(c) (2018).
3. 17 U.S.C. § 114(a) (2018).
4. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2018) (defining “publicly”).
5. First Amended Class Action Complaint at 1, Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio,
Inc., 821 F.3d 265 (2d Cir. 2016) (No. 13CV05784), 2013 WL 6779974 at *2.
6. Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., 70 N.E.3d 936 (2016).
7. Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., 229 So. 3d 305 (Fla. 2017).
8. Flo & Eddie, Inc v. Pandora Media, Inc., 851 F.3d 950 (9th Cir. 2016).
9. As of the final draft of this note, this certified question is still pending before the
Supreme Court of California.
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Flo & Eddie’s argument builds on a 2005 case, Capitol Records v.
Naxos of America,10 which held that a sound recording that would have en-
tered the public domain if it had been protected under the Copyright Act
could still be protected by New York’s common law copyright regime. The
court found that only two limitations in the Copyright Act apply to state
level copyright protection of sound recordings. The Copyright Act totally
preempted state copyright for recordings created after 1972 and limited the
duration of state copyright in pre-1972 sound recordings to 2067.11 Ex-
tending this reasoning, the Copyright Act’s denial of public performance
rights to sound recordings would not prevent a state from extending such
protection to sound recordings made prior to 1972. Indeed, none of the bal-
ancing features of federal copyright law would constrain state-level copy-
right protection.12 So states can strike a completely different balance on
almost every major policy consideration in copyright law, including dura-
tion, DMCA safe harbors, statutory licenses under §§ 114 and 115, and the
limitations, such as fair use, in §§ 107 through 122. For this reason, the
Copyright Office has noted that state copyright of pre-1972 sound record-
ings “has given rise to a number of significant policy concerns”.13
In the case of public performance rights, one of the policy balances with
the greatest market influence is that terrestrial radio stations do not have to
pay the owner of the sound recording to play a new song.14 Only the owner
of the copyright in the musical composition can demand such compensation.
If Flo & Eddie are successful in arguing for state protection of an exclusive
public performance right in their sound recordings, then radio stations may
be required to pay record labels (the typical owners of sound recording
rights in the music industry), in addition to music publishers (the typical
owners of the copyright in the musical composition), for any song recorded
prior to 1972; including commercially important songs by artists such as the
Beatles, the Supremes, the Beach Boys, and Jimi Hendrix. This could have a
devastating impact on stations whose library consists of music mostly from
this era.15
All of this depends, of course, on whether any states actually recognize
a public performance right in sound recordings. In assessing the plausibility
of states recognizing such a right, the robustness of Flo & Eddie’s litigation
strategy bears consideration. The duo have entered a partial settlement with
10. Capitol Records, Inc. v. Naxos of America, Inc., 830 N.E.2d 250 (N.Y. 2005).
11. Id. at 263.
12. MARIA A. PALLANTE, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, FEDERAL COPYRIGHTS PROTECTION
FOR PRE-1972 SOUND RECORDINGS 86 (Dec. 2011).
13. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COPYRIGHT AND THE MUSIC MARKETPLACE 53 (Feb.
2015).
14. See id. at 13.
15. Kyle Prillman, Flo & Eddie, Inc. V. Sirius XM Radio, Inc.: Will Terrestrial Radio
and Pre-1972 Sound Recordings Remain “Happy Together”?, 50 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 191,
214 (2016).
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Sirius XM that allows them to continue pressing different cases in different
states, so that they can enjoy a significant guaranteed payout, while also
pursuing favorable precedents in state supreme courts across the country.16
Even getting just a few victories out of fifty states could give pre-1972 per-
formers an opportunity to substantially control the use of their songs by ra-
dio and internet broadcasters. Furthermore, as discussed above, none of the
limitations on the federal copyright monopoly would apply to these state-
level copyrights.
For these reasons, the proposals for addressing or averting the chaos that
might befall the retro music industry if any states should establish a public
performance right in pre-1972 sound recordings have generally dealt with
changes to federal law, rather than counting on each and every state to reject
such a right. The Copyright Office, for example, has suggested that Con-
gress should extend federal copyright protection to pre-1972 sound record-
ings in order to guarantee that the limitations and exceptions in the
Copyright Act will apply to these works.17  While this note does not offer a
suggestion for amending the Copyright Act, like the Copyright Office, it
proposes a solution under federal law. This note asserts the following three
textual arguments for interpreting the Copyright Act as expressly preempting
state-level public performance rights in pre-1972 sound recordings:
(1) the phrase in 17 U.S.C. § 114(a), “The exclusive rights of the
owner of copyright in a sound recording are limited to the rights
specified by clauses (1), (2), (3) and (6) of section 106”, refers to all
copyrights, both federal and state;
(2) in the first sentence of § 301(c), “With respect to sound record-
ings fixed before February 15, 1972, any rights or remedies under
the common law or statutes of any State shall not be annulled or
limited by this title until February 15, 2067.”, the phrase “the com-
mon law or statutes of any State” refers to law that existed at the
time this language was added in 1978, not law that might be
adopted in the future; and
(3) the word “annulled” in § 301(c) means to cancel an existing
right, rather than to prevent a new right from coming into existence.
Under these arguments, the Copyright Act would explicitly preempt
state level public performance rights in pre-1972 sound recordings.
Problems with the interpretation presented in this note include:
(1) § 301(c) appears at first impression to entirely disavow preemp-
tion, nearly the opposite effect as proposed;
16. See Gatti, supra note 1.
17. Pallante, supra note 12, at 120-22.
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(2) it places most of its force on a few key terms like “annulled”
and “the common law or statutes of any State”; and
(3) the word annulled is used in several different contexts in the
same section.
Features of this interpretation include:
(1) it would directly counter what may otherwise be interpreted as
an explicit disavowal of preemption, a problem for the field pre-
emption and dormant commerce clause arguments which would
typically require congressional silence on preemption;
(2) earlier in § 301, “the common law or statutes of any State” is
modified by the phrase “whether created before or after that date
and whether published or unpublished”, suggesting that the lack of
this modifier in subsection (c) means that it is referring only to ex-
isting law; and
(3) elsewhere in the Copyright Act, including § 1201, copyright is
referred to as rights “under this title”, suggesting that the reference
to copyright in § 114(a) is broader and includes state copyrights.
The following section, Part I will summarize music copyright to provide
a general legal background for how the problem of state-level public per-
formance rights in pre-1972 sound recordings came about. Part II will de-
scribe the different categories of preemption with the goal of showing why
federal courts have so far found arguments for preemption of these laws
unconvincing. Part III will advance an interpretation, outlined above, that the
Copyright Act explicitly preempts these state laws. Part IV will conclude
with a short summary outlining the primary advantages of this interpretation
over the other approaches.
PART I – COPYRIGHT IN THE MUSIC INDUSTRY
In 1971, Congress amended the Copyright Act to extend, to musical
performers, most of the exclusive rights in copyright.18 Prior to the effective
date of this amendment (February 15, 1972), federal copyright law protected
only the musical composition written by the songwriter or composer, and not
the sound recording created by the performers and audio engineers. Thus,
state level copyright protection provided the only remedy to piracy for these
artists.19
Since this change, federal copyright law recognizes two distinct copy-
rights for each new song – the copyright in the musical composition, initially
owned by the composer, and usually sold to a music publisher, and the copy-
18. Sound Recordings Act, PUB. L. NO. 92-140, 85 Stat. 39 (1971).
19. Pallante, supra note 12, at 5.
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right in the sound recording, initially owned by the performers and audio
engineers and usually transferred to a record label.20 Thus, in order to in-
clude Whitney Houston’s cover of “I Will Always Love You” in a DVD
release of the 1992 film The Bodyguard, one would need to pay for two
copyright licenses: first to Dolly Parton (who retained the rights to underly-
ing music)21 for a license to produce copies of her original composition, and
second to RCA Music Group (whose sub-label Arista produced the original
soundtrack to The Bodyguard)22 for a license to copy the sound recording of
Whitney Houston’s version of the song. RCA might then pay some of its
licensing fee to Houston’s estate, depending on her recording contract. By
comparison, in order to record a new version of the song, one would only
need to pay Parton for the rights to the musical composition. This is because
the copyright in sound recordings only protects artists against direct copying
of the copyrighted recording, not against making new, very similar
recordings.23
In order to play Whitney Houston’s version of the song over the sound
system in a department store, one would need only to pay Parton, because
the right to publicly perform a work (established by § 106(4)) does not in-
clude sound recordings.24 “Public performance” is generally defined to in-
clude any performance located in a “place open to the public or at any place
where a substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of a family
and its social acquaintances [are] gathered”.25 This definition also includes
performances transmitted to multiple locations, such as through television,
radio, or the internet.26 Therefore, an in-store radio station playing Whitney
Houston’s cover of “I Will Always Love You” would only have to pay
Dolly Parton for the right to perform her musical composition because the
Copyright Act makes clear that the general public performance right does
not apply to sound recordings, such as Houston’s recording of Parton’s com-
position. The Copyright Act clarifies that there is no general public perform-
ance right in sound recordings by explicitly stating so in § 114(a). “The
exclusive rights of the owner of copyright in a sound recording are limited to
the rights specified by clauses (1), (2), (3) and (6) of section 106, and do not
include any right of performance under section 106(4).” (emphasis added).27
20. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, Musical Compositions and Sound Recordings, https://
www.copyright.gov/register/pa-sr.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2018).
21. Matt Alpert, The Surprising Backstory of Dolly Parton’s ‘I Will Always Love You’,
http://www.wideopencountry.com/the-greatest-country-love-song-of-all-time/ (last visited
Mar. 1, 2018).
22. INTERNET MOVIE DATABASE, The Bodyguard Soundtracks, http://www.imdb.com/
title/tt0103855/soundtrack.
23. 17 U.S.C. § 114(b).
24. 17 U.S.C. § 114(a).
25. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (“publicly” (1)).
26. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (“publicly” (2)).
27. 17 U.S.C. § 114(a) (emphasis added).
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Therefore owners of the rights in sound recordings cannot demand payment,
under federal law, for the use of their sound recordings on terrestrial radio,
in-store radio, or at public events.28
This fact – that most public performances would only require a music
licensee to pay the composer – is the feature of federal copyright policy
subject to attack by Flo & Eddie’s recent litigation. In September 2014, the
United States District Court for the Central District of California ruled that
California’s state copyright law (Cal. Civ. Code § 980(a)(2)) granted record-
ing artists a public performance right in their sound recordings.29 Since then,
courts in three states have addressed the issue of whether their states grant a
public performance right in sound recordings. The highest courts of New
York and Florida determined that the common law does not grant a public
performance right to the owners of sound recordings,30,31 while the Supreme
Court of California has accepted certified questions on the issue.32
If any state court rules in favor of a public performance right for sound
recordings, the consequences will extend well beyond Pandora and Sirius
XM. It would likely mean that terrestrial radio stations and large events
would have to pay record labels as well as music publishers.33 Most strik-
ingly, record labels would be able to negotiate without any of the limitations
in the Copyright Act.34 Unlike Pandora’s and Sirius XM’s non-interactive
subscription music streaming services, terrestrial radio stations would not be
able to rely on the statutory license in § 114.35 The special provisions for
archivists and librarians in § 108 also would not apply.36 Even a fair use of a
sample from a pre-1972 song in a YouTube video or a classroom would not
be protected by § 107.37 Because this is a state law question, none of the
balancing features of federal copyright law would apply.
For these reasons, federal courts interpreting state law have approached
the issue with caution, with all three federal circuit courts addressing it send-
28. There is a limited public performance right for public performance by means of
digital audio transmission under 17 U.S.C. § 106(6). So rights holders can demand payment
from Pandora and Sirius XM. The existence of this limited right also bolsters the conclusion
that there is no general public performance right in the Copyright Act.
29. Flo & Eddie Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio Inc., No. CV 13–5693 PSG (RZx), 2014 WL
4725382, at *4 (C.D. Cal. 2014 Sept. 22, 2014).
30. See Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., 70 N.E.3d 936, 937 (N.Y. 2016).
31. See Flo & Eddie, Inc. v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., 229 So. 3d 305, 319 (Fla. 2016).
32. Flo & Eddie, Inc., v. Pandora Media, Inc., No. S240649, 2017 Cal. LEXIS 3691
(May, 17 2017).
33. PALLANTE, supra note 13, at 13.
34. PALLANTE, supra note 12, at 263.
35. 17 U.S.C. § 114(d).
36. PALLANTE, supra note 12, at 86.
37. Id.
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ing certified questions on the issue to the relevant state supreme court.38
Meanwhile, commentators, including the Copyright Office, have treated the
prospect of state level protection of a public performance right in pre-1972
sound recordings as a problem that needs to be solved.39 These commenta-
tors have argued that state action in this area falls under some theory of
preemption,40 or have proposed amending the Copyright Act to federalize
copyright in pre-1972 sound recordings. The different theories of federal
preemption, and their application to these cases, will be discussed in the
following section, Part II. Part III will then present this note’s theory of
express preemption under § 114(a).
PART II – FEDERAL PREEMPTION GENERALLY
Federal preemption of state law falls into three broad categories: express
preemption, conflict preemption, and field preemption.41 In express preemp-
tion, a federal statute will directly and explicitly say that some defined set of
state law is being preempted.42 Such preemption can also be inferred from
the structure and purpose of a statute.43 A state law will be preempted under
conflict preemption when it interferes with the objects of federal law,44 or
when an otherwise law-abiding citizen or company cannot possibly adhere
to both laws.45 Field preemption applies when Congress has not expressly
stated that only federal law governs a particular issue, but has enacted such a
broad and specific regulatory scheme that allowing states to alter that
scheme would disrupt Congress’s intended policy choices.46 Federal law
may also field preempt state law when national nature of the interests in-
volved “imperatively requires that federal power in the field [. . .] be left
entirely free from local interference”.47 Express preemption generally re-
quires a direct statement that state law will not apply. There is no simple
formula for determining whether Congress has explicated its desire to super-
sede all state laws on a particular subject matter.48 All that is required is that
a “provision provides a reliable indicium of congressional intent with respect
38. Flo & Eddie, Inc v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., 821 F.3d 265 (2d Cir. 2016); Flo &
Eddie, Inc v. Pandora Media, Inc., 851 F.3d 950 (9th Cir. 2016); Flo & Eddie, Inc v. Pandora
Media, Inc., 827 F.3d 1016 (11th Cir. 2016).
39. See generally PALLANTE, supra note 12.
40. See e.g., Gary Pulsinelli, Happy Together? The Uneasy Coexistence of Federal and
State Protection for Sound Recordings, 82 TENN. L. REV. 167 (2014).
41. Arizona v. U.S., 567 U.S. 387, 399 (2012).
42. Pac. Gas and Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461
U.S. 190, 203 (1983).
43. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977).
44. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
45. Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963).
46. Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n. v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982) (quot-
ing Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
47. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. at 63.
48. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 561 (1973).
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to state authority”.49 As a useful example, however, consider the express
preemption clause in § 301(a) which states:
On and after January 1, 1978, all legal or equitable rights that are
equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of
copyright as specified by section 106 in works of authorship that are
fixed in a tangible medium of expression and come within the sub-
ject matter of copyright as specified by sections 102 and 103,
whether created before or after that date and whether published or
unpublished, are governed exclusively by this title. Thereafter, no
person is entitled to any such right or equivalent right in any such
work under the common law or statutes of any State.50
The essential characteristic here is that the preemption statute refers directly
to a defined set laws and clarifies that such laws will have no effect, or that
they will not apply toward a certain end or in a certain context. In the above
example, laws that grant rights with the same scope, and that cover the same
subject matter, as the Copyright Act, are expressly preempted beginning Jan-
uary 1, 1978.
Under conflict preemption, a particular state law may also be preempted
to the extent that it interferes or conflicts with federal law. In such cases, the
task “is not to pass judgment on the reasonableness of state policy”, but
rather, “to decide if a state rule conflicts with or otherwise stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objec-
tives of the federal law.”51 Conflict preemption analysis “turns on the actual
content of [the state’s] policy and its real effect on federal rights.”52 Conflict
preemption also occurs when “compliance with both federal and state regu-
lations is a physical impossibility.”53
Note how conflict preemption is particularized to an individual state
policy. Conflict preemption, unlike express preemption, does not create a
blanket prohibition on a defined set of state law. It looks at a specific state
law and its interaction with federal policy.54 So a precedent that an analo-
gous law in another state was preempted does not immediately establish that
a given state law is conflict preempted. It might make for an easy case, but
the precedent only settled that the analogous law was preempted. Thus, the
49. Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 517 (1992) (quoting Malone v. White
Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 505 (1978)) (internal quotation omitted).
50. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a).
51. Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 120 (1994) (quoting Brown v. Hotel Employ-
ees, 468 U.S. 491, 501 (1984)) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
52. Id. at 119.
53. Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, 373 U.S. at 142-43.
54. See e.g., Brown v. Hotel & Rest. Emps. & Bartenders Int’l Union Local 54, 468
U.S. 491, 104 S. Ct. 3179 (1984) (“certain state disqualification requirements are compatible
with §7. This is particularly true in the case of New Jersey’s disqualification criteria”).
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difference between express preemption and conflict preemption can be de-
lineated by how a case finding each type of preemption would frame its
holding. An express preemption case will have a holding to the effect that
Federal Statute X is interpreted as saying that all state laws in category Y are
null and void.55 A conflict preemption case will have a holding to the effect
that Statute X in State Y is preempted because of how it interferes with the
policy embodied in Federal Statute Z.56 Because this only resolves a dispute
about a particular law in a particular state, other state laws, even very similar
ones, need to be litigated separately.
Like conflict preemption, field preemption is based on the policy that
federal interests should supersede state law. But, like express preemption,
field preemption has the effect of nullifying state laws wholesale (as de-
scribed in the previous paragraph). Under field preemption, the intent to void
state law may be evidenced by a “scheme of federal regulation [. . .] so
pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for
the States to supplement it.”57 Alternatively, “the Act of Congress may touch
a field in which the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system
will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same sub-
ject.”58 Like conflict preemption, field preemption infers incompatibility
from the presumed policy goals of a federal statutory scheme; but like ex-
press preemption, it applies that incompatibility – as a blanket prohibition –
against all state laws within a defined category.59
In deciding preemption cases, courts “start with the assumption that the
historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal
Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”60 Observe
that there is a condition on this presumption. The Court in Santa Fe Elevator
prefaced its application of the presumption against preemption by explaining
that “Congress legislated here in a field which the States have traditionally
55. See e.g. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 524 (Petitioner’s claims are pre-empted to the extent
that they rely on a state-law “requirement or prohibition. . . with respect to. . . advertising or
promotion.”) (quoting the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, PUB. L. NO. 91-222,
84 Stat. 88 (1969).
56. See Pub. Util. Comm’n of State of Cal. v. U.S., 355 U.S. 534, 543-44 (1958) (“It
also seems clear that under s 530 of the California Public Utilities Code this discretion of the
federal officers may be exercised and reduced rates used only if the Commission approves.
The question is whether California may impose this restraint or control on federal transporta-
tion procurement. . .. Here the conflict between the federal policy of negotiated rates and the
state policy of regulation of negotiated rates seems to us to be clear”).
57. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
58. Id.
59. Pac. Gas and Elec. Co., 461 U.S. at 212 (“the federal government has occupied the
entire field of nuclear safety concerns, except the limited powers expressly ceded to the
states.”).
60. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Eleva-
tor Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
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occupied.”61 The reasoning in Santa Fe Elevator does not extend to fields
that states have not typically governed.62 When “Congress has legislated in
the field from the earliest days of the Republic, creating an extensive federal
statutory and regulatory scheme [. . .]  [n]o artificial presumption aids us in
determining the scope of appropriate local regulation.”63 Indeed, an almost
opposite presumption underlies cases dealing with fields predominantly reg-
ulated by the federal government. The Supreme Court “has repeatedly de-
cline[d] to give broad effect to saving clauses where doing so would upset
the careful regulatory scheme established by federal law.”64 In such a case,
the narrowly construed saving clause will “not bar the ordinary working of
conflict preemption principles.”65
Even without a presumption against preemption, the difficulty with ap-
plying conflict preemption or field preemption to pre-1972 sound recordings
is that Congress has spoken. § 301(c) clarifies that the Copyright Act is
compatible with at least some (and possibly all) state laws governing copy-
right for such works.66 Therefore, arguing for either conflict preemption or
field preemption will necessarily depend on a reading of § 301(c) that does
not totally disavow preemption in all pre-1972 sound recording cases. Ex-
press preemption also depends on such an understanding of § 301(c). This
note advances such an interpretation of § 301(c) in Part III-B, presenting the
case that the disavowal of preemption only applies to state laws that existed
at the time this section was added to the Copyright Act in 1978. So the
argument for the other forms of preemption substantially depends on the
viability of this note’s case for narrowly construing the disavowal of pre-
emption § 301(c).
The several state and federal courts adjudicating the Flo & Eddie cases
have generally treated preemption arguments suspiciously. The 2nd Circuit
responded to the defendant’s dormant commerce clause argument (a princi-
ple that somewhat overlaps with field preemption by constraining states
from enacting policies that would compromise Congress’s exclusive author-
ity to regulate interstate commerce) by noting that “the dormant Commerce
Clause is not something we can adjudicate without knowing what, if
any, limitations New York places on” the public performance right.67 The
11th Circuit described all pre-1972 sound recordings as falling into “one of
the limited areas in which state common law copyright may continue to op-
61. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. at 230.
62. Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293, 310 n.13 (1988) (“That case,
however, involved a field of regulation that, unlike the regulation of natural gas company
securities issuances, “the States ha[d] traditionally occupied.””) (internal citation omitted).
63. United States v. Locke, 529 US 89, 108 (2000).
64. Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 529 U.S. 861, 870 (2000) (quoting
United States v. Locke, 529 US 89, 106 (2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
65. Id., at 869 (internal emphasis omitted).
66. 17 U.S.C. § 301(c) (2012).
67. Flo & Eddie, Inc v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., 821 F.3d 265, 272 (2d Cir. 2016).
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erate”, citing only § 301(c).68 Similarly, the 9th Circuit simply states that
“the 1976 Act left the common law in place to protect pre-1972 sound re-
cordings”, again with reference to only § 301(c).69 Given this very limited
treatment, courts are not currently treating preemption as a significant possi-
bility. That is a perfectly reasonable initial response to § 301(c). The posi-
tion taken by this note is not initially the easier position to defend based on
this line of cases. Nevertheless, given the many problems created by state
recognition of public performance rights in pre-1972 sound recordings, it is
worth making the case for preemption.
PART III – THE COPYRIGHT ACT EXPRESSLY PREEMPTS STATE LEVEL
PUBLIC PERFORMANCE RIGHTS FOR PRE-1972 SOUND RECORDINGS
A. § 114(a) Should be Interpreted Broadly to Include State Copyrights.
§ 114(a) reads “The exclusive rights of the owner of copyright in a
sound recording are limited to the rights specified by clauses (1), (2), (3) and
(6) of section 106, and do not include any right of performance under section
106(4).”70 The copyright act does not define the word “copyright”,71 and
although it defines “copyright owner”, it only states that the term “refers to
the owner of [a] particular right”, not specifying any limitation on the source
of that right.72 Without a statutory definition, the word “copyright” here
could have a few different meanings. It could mean all of the rights granted
under Title 17 of the US Code, all such rights referred to within Title 17 as
copyright, or any rights that it would be legally accurate to refer to as copy-
rights, thus including state level copyrights. If § 114(a) has the last meaning
here, then owners of copyrights in sound recordings, whether federal or state
in origin, would only enjoy the exclusive right to make copies and derivative
works, distribute the work publicly, and publicly perform the work by means
of digital audio transmission.
Under this interpretation, § 114(a) would also explicitly deny them the
general exclusive right to control public performances of their works. Note
that, although it overlaps significantly with conflict preemption, this is an
express preemption theory. Even though it does not directly refer to state
statutes as such, it does refer to a defined set of law that contains state stat-
utes and common law, and then specifies that this law will not apply toward
a particular end. The reading of § 114(a) presented here is equivalent to a
provision that reads “no copyright in sound recordings, no matter the source,
grants public performance rights”. With that phrasing, it is “no matter the
source” that references state law, whereas, under the theory presented in this
68. Flo & Eddie, Inc v. Sirius XM Radio, Inc., 827 F.3d 1016, 1019 (11th Cir. 2016).
69. Flo & Eddie, Inc v. Pandora Media, Inc., 851 F.3d 950, 953 (9th Cir. 2017).
70. 17 U.S.C. § 114(a).
71. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
72. Id. at “copyright owner”.
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note, it is a broad interpretation of the word “copyright”, inclusive of state
copyrights, that references state law.
The primary textual reason to adopt this meaning is that, in other sec-
tions, the Copyright Act refers specifically to federal copyrights using some
qualifier attached to the word “copyright”. In § 1201, copyright is referred to
as rights “under this title”.73 § 201 similarly expressly limits its reference to
copyright to only include “[c]opyright in a work protected under this title”.74
The definition of “work of visual art” also modifies “copyright protection”
with “under this title”.75 For comparison, the definition of “United States
work” refers to copyright protection granted by foreign countries.76 So the
Copyright Act appears to envision that “copyright” may refer to copyrights
other than those granted by the United States federal government. The dis-
tinctively unmodified usage in § 114(a) suggests that “copyright”, without
any limitation as to the source, is meant to apply to any kind of copyright,
either federal or state.
The potential for policy conflict between a narrow interpretation of
§ 114(a) and the other subsections of § 114 offers another compelling reason
to broadly interpret § 114(a)’s rejection of public performance rights in
sound recordings. § 114(b) creates special definitions, applied only to sound
recordings, for the exclusive rights in § 106. Copying a sound recording, for
example, does not include mimicking the sounds therein, but only transfer-
ring the data directly to a new fixed medium. The right to make derivative
works similarly does not include fixing new, but similar, sounds into a new
recording. It only includes remixing and rearranging the original sounds as
fixed in the original recording.77 This is why cover artists are only required
to pay composers (or their transferees) and not the original performing artists
and sound engineers. § 114(d-f) creates a complicated system of statutory
licensing for digital audio transmissions of sound recordings, including adju-
dicative proceedings in front of Copyright Royalty Judges.78 If states can
protect certain sound recordings independently of the limitations of § 114,
this entire system of regulation is bypassed for such recordings. Accepting
that states can do this means accepting that, in 1976, when it enacted § 301,
Congress intended to override its own policies in §114(b) with respect to all
then existing sound recordings except those created in the previous four
years. All of this absurdity can be avoided simply by taking the word “copy-
right” as used in § 114(a) to mean both federal and state copyrights.
73. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (1999).
74. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2012).
75. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (“work of visual art”).
76. Id. at “United States Work”.
77. 17 U.S.C. § 114(b).
78. Id. at (d-f).
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B. § 301(c) Should be Interpreted Narrowly to Include only State Laws
in Existence in 1978.
The first and most immediate problem with the above interpretation of
§ 114(a) is that § 301(c) contains a disavowal of preemption of state level
copyright law covering pre-1972 sound recordings. The relevant part reads
“[w]ith respect to sound recordings fixed before February 15, 1972, any
rights or remedies under the common law or statutes of any State shall not
be annulled or limited by this title until February 15, 2067.”79 To severely
understate the matter, this provision means that at least some state laws with
respect to pre-1972 sound recordings are not preempted by anything in the
Copyright Act. Arguably, this includes any state laws, no matter when en-
acted, dealing with pre-1972 sound recordings.
But how broadly should we understand the phrase “the common law or
statutes of any State”? Should it include all state laws, no matter when en-
acted and no matter how adverse to federal policy? On the one hand, reading
it expansively has many undesirable policy consequences. On the other
hand, the broader reading appears to accord with the phrase’s ordinary
meaning, which courts should prefer.80 § 301(c) refers to “any rights or rem-
edies under the common law or statutes of any State”, and the Court has
stated that “[r]ead naturally, the word ‘any’ has an expansive meaning”,
which includes all nonempty sets “indiscriminately of whatever kind”.81 This
suggests that the passage should be read very broadly. “Any”, however,
modifies “rights or remedies” not “the common law or statutes”.  The text of
this provision thus leaves us without clarification as to the breadth of the
phrase “the common law or statutes of any State”. If the phrase “the com-
mon law of statutes of any State” is limited in some fashion that is not im-
mediately apparent, then, since § 301(c) only applies to “any rights or
remedies under the common law or statute of any State”, then the disavowal
of preemption of those rights and remedies would have that same limitation.
One of the most important places to look for guidance on possible non-
obvious limitations in § 301(c) is the rest of § 301. Here, § 301(a) provides a
compelling reason to think that Congress used the phrase “the common law
or statutes of any State” to refer only to law that existed at the time this
language was added. § 301(a) expressly preempts state copyright protections
with the same scope and subject matter as the Copyright Act. In describing
the intended preemption, Congress clarifies that it applies to state common
law and statutes “whether created before or after that date [January 1, 1978]
and whether published or unpublished”.82 The lack of this modifier for the
phrase “the common law or statutes of any State” in § 301(c) suggests that
79. 17 U.S.C. 301(c).
80. Smith v. United States, 508 US 223, 228 (1993).
81. U.S. v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 5 (1997).
82. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a)
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Congress intended only to shield then existing state laws from preemption.
“[W]here Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute
but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that
Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclu-
sion.”83 In § 301(c), if Congress wanted the carve out from the preemption to
apply to future state laws, it could have added the same modifying phrase it
added to preemption itself in § 301(a). The rule in Russello would even ex-
tend this reasoning to other sections “of the same Act”. Applying it here,
where the modifier is present in one clause but absent in another within the
same section, with both clauses dealing exclusively with the extent of pre-
emption, is much more straightforward. The drafters of § 301 would have
failed to see an obvious difference in nearby clauses if this distinction were
accidental. So it seems reasonable to apply the interpretive principle in Rus-
sello and ascribe meaning to Congress’s omission of the phrase “whether
created before or after that date” in § 301(c), thus bolstering the conclusion
that it only applies to then existing state law.
While hesitance to apply a non-explicit limitation of § 301(c) to existing
state law is understandable, a further reason to avoid such hesitance is that
assumptions about temporality of statutory language are not without prece-
dent. Courts regularly refuse to apply a statute retroactively even when its
express terms do not contain such a limitation. In Landgraf v. USI Film
Products, the Supreme Court refused to retroactively apply the Civil Rights
Act of 1991 (Pub. L. 102-166), even though it found that the petitioner met
all of the express limitations of the relevant section of the act, and the act
never explicitly specified that this section could not be applied retroactively
and there was no controversy over whether Congress could have constitu-
tionally applied the act retroactively.84 In effect, the tense of relevant provi-
sion in the 1991 Civil Rights Act was determined not by any explicit
language or by constitutional avoidance, but by the “[e]lementary considera-
tions of fairness”85 that underlie the presumption against retroactivity that
the Court utilized in that case. So, although there may be some benefit in
taking statutory grammar choices at face value, it does not appear to be
strictly required under the plain meaning rule.86
Applying this to a case interpreting a disavowal of preemption, consider
if Congress had written “No State statute providing copyright protection to
pre-1972 sound recordings conflicts with this Act.” Such a statutory declara-
tion might be treated as irrefutably true, even if some existing state law
stood directly at odds with the policies underlying several sections of the
83. Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (internal quotation and citation
omitted).
84. Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244 (1994).
85. Id. at 265.
86. Although not related to temporality, courts can also fill in a missing “or” to make a
statute make sense. See e.g., Lamie v. U.S. Tr., 540 US 526 (2004).
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Copyright Act, simply because Congress enacted a law on point, and it is
Congress’s policy that preemption is meant to protect. If, however, states
subsequently enacted new statutes, with policies that directly conflicted with
those of the Copyright Act in ways that Congress could not have foreseen,
should this declaration continue to enjoy an irrefutable presumption of being
true? Probably not, since the possibility of a self-defeating tolerance of con-
flicting state law is one of the motivations for narrowly construing savings
clauses.87 Courts would be justified in inferring a temporal reference to only
those state laws in existence at the time this language was added.
Admittedly, the above example is hypothetical. Nevertheless, the same
kind of implied temporal reference could just as reasonably be found in “any
rights or remedies under the common law or statutes of any State shall not
be annulled”, because the inference stems from the impossibility for Con-
gress to determine in advance that no future state law would ever conflict
with the policies embodied in the Copyright Act. A state legislature could
enact a copyright statute that specifies that it is not limited by fair use, and
§ 301(c), if applied to future statutes, would prevent the application of § 107
of federal copyright law to limit the rights granted by the state.
Conceivably, Congress could make that strong of a commitment to state
autonomy in a given field. It could spell out that all existing and future state
laws, no matter how distorting they are of federal policy, should be given
priority over any apparently conflicting federal statute. Without a clearer
statement to that effect, however, as in Geier v. American Honda Motor Co.,
which similarly construed a disavowal of preemption narrowly, “there is no
reason to believe Congress has done so”.88 There were state laws that pro-
tected sound recordings in 1976,89 and it could be the case that Congress
simply looked at these laws, did not see any significant policy conflicts, and
sought to protect those state laws from its updates to federal copyright pol-
icy. The language of § 301(c) would then shield these laws from preemp-
tion, but not necessarily any future law no matter how perverse to federal
policy. In interpreting § 301(c), it makes far more sense to avoid imposing
on Congress a blind commitment to protect potentially conflicting future
state laws, unless the statute makes clear that it envisions such a
commitment.
Another reason to suspect that “the common law or statutes of any
State” referred to existing law is the use of the word “annulled”. In the defi-
nition relevant to questions of legal rights, “annul” generally means to can-
cel an existing right rather than to prevent a new right from coming into
87. Geier, 529 U.S. at 872.
88. Id.
89. See Steven L. Sparkman, Tape Pirates: the New “Buck”-aneer$, 21 COPYRIGHT L.
SYMP. 98, 119 (1974).
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existence.90 If future statutes were envisioned, § 301(c) could have used a
verb with less of a temporal connotation, such as “overruled”.
Alternatively, strictly interpreting “annulled” to refer only to cancella-
tion of existing rights would lead to the same outcome as offered in this
note. That is, accepting that “the common law or statutes of any State” refers
to both existing and future laws, a section of the Copyright Act (§ 114(a),
for example) can still prevent new rights from coming into existence under a
newly adopted state law. If a newly adopted state law, within the field of
pre-1972 sound recording copyrights, falls under a preemption imposed by
some section of the Copyright Act, then the rights that it purports to create
are not actually established. This is because state provisions in conflict with
federal law are “without effect”.91 Therefore, no right is annulled when a
state statute is preempted under § 114(a), because no legal right ever existed.
The other predicate in this sentence is “limit”, as in “any rights or remedies
under the common law or statutes of any State shall not be annulled or lim-
ited by this title”.92 This would also not apply to preempting future state
laws, since “limit” means “to confine or restrict”, rather than “to eliminate or
displace”.93
A further indication that “annulled” has the meaning ascribed above is
that an essential problem for Congress when it enacting the 1976 Copyright
Act was that existing owners of state copyrights had a property interest in
their copyrights. Congress did not want to take away existing rights due to
concerns with the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.94 So it selected a
word that, with respect to legal rights, means to cancel an existing right.
Thus, Congress adheres to its constitutional obligations under the Takings
Clause without making an absurd commitment to future state laws that it
could not possibly predict.
Finally, narrowly construing the preemption carve-out in the first sen-
tence of § 301(c) renders the second sentence less redundant. The second
sentence reads, “The preemptive provisions of subsection (a) shall apply to
any such rights and remedies pertaining to any cause of action arising from
undertakings commenced on and after February 15, 2067.”95 Without the
construction suggested by this note, the first sentence says that nothing in the
copyright act preempts any state protection for pre-1972 sound recordings
until 2067, whereas the second says that § 301(a) only preempts state protec-
tion of pre-1972 sound recordings beginning in 2067. The second sentence
would be completely unnecessary. This note’s construction of § 301(c) does
90. Annul, AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY (5th ed. 2017).
91. Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1982). (“It is basic to this constitutional
command that all conflicting state provisions be without effect.”).
92. 17 U.S.C. § 301(c).
93. Limit, AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY (5th ed. 2017).
94. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, 139, 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5755.
95. 17 U.S.C. § 301(c).
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not have this problem because the temporal inference in the first sentence of
§ 301(c) comes from limiting “under the common law or statutes of any
state” to previously enacted state laws. Since the second sentence does not
contain this modifying phrase for “any such rights and remedies pertaining
to any cause of action”, it could refer to rights and remedies under both
existing and future state laws.
“Any such rights” does, however, include a modifier, one that explicitly
refers to the “rights or remedies” in the previous sentence. So the “rights and
remedies” of the second sentence must pertain to those of the first. The ante-
cedent of the adjective “such” could, however, be any limiter in the previous
sentence. That is, the accurate paraphrase replacing “such” could be “The
preemptive provisions of subsection (a) shall apply to any rights and reme-
dies, with respect to sound recordings fixed before February 15, 1972, per-
taining to any cause of action arising from undertakings commenced on and
after February 15, 2067.” “Such” rights and remedies, according to this para-
phrasing, are simply those dealing with pre-1972 sound recordings. Under
this paraphrasing of the second sentence, and this note’s interpretation of the
first, the second sentence has a different effect than the first. It completely
exempts state laws dealing with pre-1972 sound recordings, whether enacted
before or after 1978, from the preemption in § 301(a). The first sentence
exempts only state laws created before 1978, but applies to all types of pre-
emption under any section of the Copyright Act. An added benefit of this
outcome is that states are not prevented from enacting new laws protecting
pre-1972 sound recordings. Only those protections that run counter to some
provision in the Copyright Act, other than § 301(a), are excluded. This, once
again, most closely matches Congress’s purpose in writing the carve out to
preemption in § 301(c). § 301(c) guarantees that states are not wholly barred
from protecting sound recordings by § 301(a), but it does not guarantee far
more than that – a carve out from all preemption theories under all sections
of the Copyright Act for any future state laws dealing with pre-1972 sound
recordings.
PART IV – CONCLUSION
Interpreting § 114(a) as applying to all copyrights, federal and state,
works textually because elsewhere in the Copyright act it refers to copyright
with the limiting phrase “work protected under this title”.96 Secondly, a nar-
rower reading of “copyright” in § 114(a) would mean that the other subsec-
tions of § 114, including a complicated system for creating statutory
licenses, would have been completely overridden for almost all sound re-
cordings in existence at the time Congress added § 301.
While a broader reading of the saving clause in § 301(c) would make
this interpretation of § 114(a) impossible, since all state action related to pre-
96. E.g., 17 U.S.C. § 1201(A).
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1972 sound recordings would be protected from any preemption theory, a
narrower reading is justified on several grounds. As a matter of policy, it
makes little sense to think that Congress intended to make the only surviving
scope of state copyright immune to every balancing feature of the Copyright
Act, even fair use. The use of the modifier “whether created before or after
that date” in § 301(a) also implies that Congress only meant “the common
law or statutes of any State” in § 301(c) to refer to state law that existed in
1978. Since the narrower interpretation only requires inferring a temporal
reference – a not unheard-of practice of statutory construction97 – courts
should not assume that Congress intended to permit any state copyright law
governing pre-1972 sound recordings, no matter how much in conflict with
federal policy. This is especially so considering that Congress’s purpose in
allowing a temporary continuance of some state copyrights was to avoid
unconstitutionality under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.98 Fi-
nally, this interpretation of the first sentence of § 301(c) prevents the second
sentence from being redundant, giving the latter the unique role of shielding
all state created rights in pre-1972 sound recordings, regardless of when they
were enacted, from the total preemption of § 301(a).
The conflict preemption and field preemption approaches to this prob-
lem both suffer from the same difficulty of § 301(c)’s carve out as the ex-
press preemption theory presented in this note. If the narrow construction
suggested here fails, then these preemption theories fair no better than ex-
press preemption. Indeed, field preemption might fail even under the nar-
rower construction of § 301(c), because the theory of field preemption is that
Congress’s regulatory scheme is so delicate that no state regulation is per-
mitted.99 As strongly as it argues for a limited interpretation of § 301(c),
even this note admits that the clause must permit some state protections of
pre-1972 sound recordings. Since field preemption is even stricter than that,
it is hard to square with § 301(c).
Compared to conflict preemption, express preemption does not necessa-
rily have a significant advantage in terms of the validity of the arguments for
why it should apply. Indeed, many of the arguments presented above – in-
cluding the potential sidestepping of fair use and DMCA safe harbors and
the near irrelevance of the § 114 statutory licenses – are readily applicable to
conflict preemption. Certain state laws would interfere so greatly with Con-
gress’s copyright policy, that it would be unreasonable to think that Con-
gress intended to shield them from preemption.
The express preemption theory does have one significant advantage –
the robustness of the outcome that it would establish. Unlike conflict pre-
emption, it broadly and proactively restrains states from enacting statutes
97. See e.g. U.S. v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89.
98. E.g., H.R. REP. 94-1476, at 139, 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5755.
99. Rice, 331 U.S. at 230.
290 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 24:271
that distort federal copyright policy, rather than dealing with each potential
conflict on a case-by-case basis.100 Express preemption is also justified by
the text of § 114(a), as long as the reference to copyright includes state
copyrights,101 a position with compelling statutory evidence.
For these reasons, Federal courts adjudicating pre-1972 sound recording
cases should seriously consider overturning any state laws that would grant a
public performance right in such recordings, holding that these laws are ex-
pressly preempted by § 114(a) of the Copyright Act.
100. Compare Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 524, with Pub. Utils. Comm’n of State of Cal., 355
U.S. at 543-44.
101. 17 U.S.C. § 114(a) (2012).
